Neo-Feudalism: Paradigm of Russo-Ukrainian Trade and Commercial Relations

Abstract

State weakness, expressed as the inability to fulfill its obligations as welfare provider, is a condition which forces constituents into developing their own system of protection, which breeds new loyalty structures. These structures do not always correspond to the exact border delimitation of a State, and frequently transcend geographic boundaries. Evidence of this can be seen, for example, in the progressive privatization of healthcare in countries that prided themselves in publicly-funded health services, in the “gated communities” sprouting in the United States, employing private security firms, and, most prominently, in the proliferation of private security firms of an increasing level of coercive capacity. These are employed to protect oil and gas workers in Western Africa, and, most tellingly for the prospect of neo-feudalism, have emerged as auxiliary State structures in Ukraine and Russia. In the latter case, the existence of privately-funded security forces may complicate the understanding and exercise of sovereignty over disputed territories — like the Donbas. It can also complicate the deployment of international peace missions and the execution of a mandate which would normally see the belligerents as State actors, and obviate non-State security participants. This study argues that State weakness is a harbinger of neo-feudalism. By identifying the markers of feudalism from the literature, this study supports the argument for neo-feudalism by showing where these markers are found in current affairs, and particularly in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, which is used as a case study. While the study does not identify trends widespread enough to provide for a generalization, there are nevertheless grounds to support the notion that neo-feudalism can occur in certain conditions. The implications for the deployment of State forces and multilateral peace support forces are that non-State security actors (like private security companies, or sponsors of private armies) should be considered as party to a conflict, and, absent international legislation forbidding the use of such forces, should also be among the international interlocutors of peace support elements