

UDC 327.56 330.4 355.013

JEL Classification D74, D81, F51, H56, I25, O52, P48

Sergei Vakarin

Ukrainian-Russian Peace Negotiations: Hybrid Conflict Resolution and Its Economic Aspects

The ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war involves the use of hybrid warfare, including economic and other elements. Each party has its own strategy for utilizing all these elements. The strategy, however, may change depending on current needs and performance indicators. The international community is trying to persuade the conflict parties to agree on an armistice or at least long-term cessation of hostilities. However, conventional diplomacy has resulted in limited progress. There is a number of ideological, social and other factors that may be treated by a conflict party as sufficient reasons to continue the war. So far no peacemaker managed to formulate any reasons to end the war that would seem more convincing to both parties simultaneously than the reasons to continue it.

The article explores alternative conflict resolution approaches. The author analyzes and evaluates the tasks, actions and challenges faced by a country in modern peace negotiations with Ukraine as a case study. Recommendations are given to the negotiators. These recommendations are intended to help them conduct effective negotiations, understand the other conflicting party and come to an agreement on a basis of bargaining, so that both parties receive some benefit simultaneously ("win-win" scenario), foregoing zero-sum approaches..

Keywords: *peace negotiations, conflict resolution, armistice, ceasefire, Russian-Ukrainian war, hybrid warfare, Ukraine, innovation, recovery*

DOI 10.37659/2663-5070-2024-13-4-12

Introduction

The ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war is a new type of war that involves the use of hybrid warfare, including economic, diplomatic, informational and other elements.

The prospect of a cease-fire/armistice in Ukraine marks a critical turning point in the ongoing conflict, which brings an opportunity of transition from active hostilities to a

period of long-term stabilization and reconstruction.

Reaching a ceasefire in such a war is a complex process that does not guarantee a quick outcome and requires an understanding of the factors that may hinder this process.

Attempts to reach peace, ceasefire, or at least cessation of hostilities are taking place in circumstances that have no parallels in the past. In addition, current politicians have much less ways to influence international events than in the recent past. Domestically, especially in dictatorships, a wide range of tools is available to the authorities for influencing the society. However, the unstable global economic situation forces politicians to resort to populism, and on the international stage, they tend to play against each other rather than collaborate. At the same time, top leaders try publicly to push through the decisions they favor. All these factors may undermine negotiations.

Trust in international organizations is also weak, partly because of their indecisiveness, superficial situation analysis, misunderstanding of local processes and the triumph of bureaucracy over efficiency. Therefore, negotiations would normally benefit if mediators are invited from third countries trusted by both parties of the conflict.

However, the real problem is not even so much in the negotiations per se. Politicians, diplomats and the military need to take into account that the modern war penetrates far beyond the traditional security and defense sector. Many other areas are affected as well, from general government and the economy to energy, food, environment, information, cyberspace etc.

Therefore, in today's highly complex world, experts from both parties (as well as from third parties trusted by the conflicting parties) with knowledge of a broad range of problem areas should be involved in negotiations, so that they can collaboratively develop a comprehensive joint solution and a plan for its implementation.

The state of Russian-Ukrainian relations makes a comprehensive peace agreement unlikely, but the experience of other wars suggests other pragmatic options such as armistice or at least cessation of hostilities.

At the same time, each conflict party has a list of goals that cannot be achieved via military means, so it formulates them as imperative demands to be met by the other party. For exam-

ple, after U.S. President Donald Trump offered both parties to negotiate mutual concessions, one party (Ukraine) showed its readiness for a compromise, while the other party (Russia) has been reluctant as it believes it can succeed on the battlefield. Such an approach is unproductive because, in reality, the situation could change in favor of the other party. Both parties must be prepared to seriously consider compromises.

However, most modern politicians are not very inclined to compromise. Politicians believe that retreating from their declared military goals will be perceived as weakness by both the opponent and their own propaganda-influenced population. As a result, deadlock situations arise, where a politician initially demands maximum concessions but then does not know how to become flexible without "losing face." At the same time, politicians demand quick results from the negotiation teams (at least for the purpose of demonstrating some success to their own people). If they cannot achieve them, they cancel negotiations altogether.

A painful military stalemate with neither of the conflict parties being able to win is a good reason to start peace negotiations. Other reasons that can trigger negotiations include economic and financial crises, natural disasters etc. In such circumstances, the adversaries may be forced to reconsider their priorities.

Negotiations may not necessarily lead to a true peace process. Even if agreements are reached on short-term/superficial issues, new conflicts may arise later. The problem may lie in deep-seated contradictions that remain unresolved or are altogether ignored during negotiations. And even if a deep analysis of the conflict is attempted, researchers often focus on issues that are painful for the parties and not easily solvable (if such solutions exist at all). Therefore, it may be advisable to shift focus to more constructive issues, particularly those related to economic and technological development.

Theoretical Frameworks

How can the parties ensure that negotiations are successful?

We start our review of the existing **theoretical frameworks** of conflict resolutions with Johan Galtung's peacebuilding theory [1], a widely applied conflict resolution and peacebuilding framework.

Galtung's conflict theory deals with the three fundamental concepts: attitudes, behavior and contradiction. These are the three elements of his conflict triangle. Conflict resolution requires altering the combination of these elements. Galtung also distinguishes the following phases of conflict resolution: peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding. Peacekeeping includes controlling the conflict actors, changing their behavior and stopping violence. Peacemaking, on the other hand, involves changing the actors' attitudes and putting them in a new formation. Finally, peacebuilding is about looking at the root of the conflict/the contradiction and overcoming it. Successful conflict intervention process (either by the conflict actors alone or by third parties) starts with peacekeeping: at this stage the behavior of aggression and destruction should go down and give place to some form of cooperation. At the stage of peacemaking the attitudes (beliefs and assumptions of the actors about themselves and one another) should become more positive, and at the same time clear, obtainable and sustainable measures should be established. Finally, peacebuilding involves changing the contradictions (incompatible goals) for the actors.

If the actors have agreed upon a border line the conflict is symmetrical. Alternatively, the conflict is asymmetrical if one of the actors claims territory controlled by the other actor who refuses to give it back. There are two other aspects to focus on in the context of conflict resolution: dissociation and association. In case of dissociation, there are two ways to keep the distance, either with geography or social distance. This can then be complemented by a peacekeeping force [1].

Galtung's violence triangle distinguishes direct violence, structural violence and cultural violence. The ways to deal with them are different: dealing with direct violence requires changing conflict behavior; dealing with structural violence requires changing structural contradictions; finally, dealing with cultural violence requires changing the attitudes in the conflict.

Galtung also distinguishes negative peace (peace with absence of violence but reached not always by peaceful means, with a pessimistic attitude and curative approach) and positive peace (peace with structural integration reached by peaceful means, with an optimistic attitude and preventive approach). He also believes state's

goals are in fact the goals of the elites projected onto the state [1].

Research on peace negotiations and mediation emphasizes the importance of including the key conflict parties in peace talks to ensure ownership and commitment from both or all stakeholders involved, so first of all, the conflict stakeholders should be identified.

Zartman and Kremenyuk [2] suggest that the negotiation process provides opportunities to address the political issues that divide the parties. These opportunities are more likely to be seized when the parties adopt a problem-solving orientation toward the discussion. They are less likely to be sought when the parties' orientations are distributive. They define problem solving as a cooperative process in which parties search for information about each other's interests and values. They also define distributive orientation as a competitive bargaining process in which the parties use tactics designed to win a contest. One path toward durable political agreements takes the following form: Cooperative (integrative) orientations → problem-solving negotiations → political agreements → cooperative regimes → supporting institutions → cooperative (integrative) orientations.

Zartman and Kremenyuk [2] argue that agreement as such is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for successful negotiation. In many cases forward-looking peace and justice have been achieved by ignoring demands for backward-looking justice, and that in other cases provisions for handling backward-looking justice have been the price paid for the establishment of forward-looking outcomes. What variables might explain this difference? In all the forward-looking cases, the decision was made ahead of time, or at the beginning of the negotiations, to shed a zero-sum mentality and look ahead rather than backward. Thus, it was a state of mind or strategic approach by the parties that allowed the construction of positive relationships, rather than these relationships growing out of the dynamics within the negotiating process itself. The parties came to a decision (or internal factions with the decision already made came to power) that peace could not be achieved through the exclusive pursuit of past grievances and that such a pursuit was counterproductive, bringing neither retributive justice nor peace.

For successful negotiations, it is useful to apply **economic categories**, particularly the practice of price negotiations between a buyer and

a seller. Such negotiations can be viewed as a bargaining process with an uncertain outcome. Accordingly, one party may make certain concessions, expecting that the other party will also make concessions. Consequently, both parties, if acting rationally, have an incentive to accept a “middle ground” approach to such concessions against the potential harm of refusal (in which case the agreement will not be reached and the conflict will continue indefinitely) [3].

According to Fisas Armengol [4], “peace process” is actually none other than a “process to bring an end to the violence and armed struggle”. The signing of a ceasefire and the subsequent signing of a peace accord is no more than the start of the real “peace process”, linked to a stage known as “post-war rehabilitation” or “post-armed conflict”, always difficult but which is really where decisions will be taken and policies implemented which, if successful, will enable the violence (structural and cultural) to be overcome and people to truly speak of having “achieved peace”.

Fisas Armengol summarizes several important aspects of the peace process [4]. **An initial exploratory phase**, also known as the pre-negotiation or exploration: agreeing the timetable and methodology to be followed, establishing a pre-agenda or initial agenda and clarifying the conflictive aspects around which there is basic disagreement or fundamental incompatibilities (the meta-conflict). This stage, in short, seeks to create confidence in the process, agrees the role to be played by third parties, rejects the imposition of plans and results in each party recognising their adversary and granting them the necessary legitimacy to negotiate. Once the exploratory work has been completed, an “agreement on what needs to be agreed” is reached and the process can now move onto “how to do it”. The sum of all these steps forms what is sometimes known as a “road map” or initial framework of what needs to be done to bring the process to its successful conclusion.

Once the formal negotiations have commenced, the parties need to make sure that the **negotiators are valid**, i.e. that they do indeed represent the main players with decision-making capacity.

The main purpose of the negotiation is for opposing parties to sit down and talk with a view to achieving something of mutual benefit in what is known as a “win-win” scenario, fore-

going zero-sum approaches in which there are winners and losers.

Reaching a minimum number of points of agreement (which is probably the most that can be expected at this stage), will help in sharing a minimum “meta-peace”, i.e. what each party understands as “peace”.

During the **exploratory phase**, agreement needs to be reached as to whether or not the principle of “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed” is to be followed or, in contrast, whether each point agreed will be valid on its own, and may even be implemented during the course of the negotiations. An intermediary position may be agreed whereby the former principle is adopted but excluding humanitarian issues, such as a ceasefire, partial mine clearing, compliance with international humanitarian law or aspects related to human rights, as was the case in the El Salvador peace process

If the negotiations make satisfactory progress then the issues on the **substantive agenda** may be discussed (the procedure will already have been agreed in advance). The final agreement will specify how it is to be implemented and by whom. This leads us, finally, to the implementation agreements, verification methods and ways of resolving the possible disagreements that may arise in the final stages.

On commencing the stage of “formal negotiations”, the parties need to ratify everything agreed in the exploratory phase, in order to avoid any doubt or new interpretations. Everything must be put in writing and, if possible, in the presence of observers/witnesses

The government therefore needs to draw up an authentic “text” on the advantages of ending the armed conflict, as do all the social sectors involved in negotiating an end to the armed conflict. It is important in this regard to enjoy the cooperation of the media.

Entering into negotiations, with all the risks this entails, means that the government should speak with just one voice and one rhetoric, favorable to the negotiations, avoiding bad experiences in which some ministers, particularly the Minister of Defence, maintain a contradictory position, probably to avoid upsetting the military. The message broadcast to the public must be clear and unified.

In negotiations between countries, in particular, unnecessary provocation should be avoid-

ed. Continued threats, of whatever kind, whether real or symbolic, are counterproductive to creating conditions favorable to the negotiations.

Given the possible difficulty of “selling” a bilateral ceasefire agreement to some sectors of public opinion, there is a possibility (which has, in fact, been tried and tested) that the parties could agree to a “de-escalation of the conflict”, with zero deaths, which would imply a “tacit bilateral ceasefire”.

It is advisable to assess whether a “buffer zone” or “separation zone” can be created, with a several kilometer-wide demilitarised area along the border in which there are no heavy weapons.

Previous Empirical Studies: Ukraine and Minsk Accords

Details of the ongoing negotiations cannot be disclosed but there is a prominent case study from the past that can serve as a lesson for any future negotiations: Minsk Accords.

Since the onset of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in 2014, multiple truces were negotiated as part of what is known as the Minsk Process (as the talks between the parties took place in Minsk, Belarus). France, Germany, and OSCE acted as mediators in negotiations. Russia, a signatory to the agreements, positioned itself as a neutral broker, while in fact being a party of the conflict. A series of international agreements were signed including the 2014 Minsk Protocol, the **Memo-randum on fulfilment of the provisions of the Protocol** [5] and the 2015 Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Accords, which is commonly called Minsk II. Following both rounds of negotiations, referred to as Minsk I and Minsk II, ceasefires were often violated.

In 2022, Minsk Accords were declared dead. In Galtung’s terms, they could be defined as “negative peace”. What was the real reason for their failure? Many reasons were suggested but the top reason was, as many experts warned, that the negotiations of the Accords did not represent all key players with decision-making capacity. Russia was present at a low level (its Ambassador to Ukraine was the top official at the negotiations) and in a role of a neutral party while it was a clear party to a wider conflict with Ukraine since occupation of Crimea.

However, this analysis does not provide the reason of such behavior of the conflict parties.

So, based on the experience of Minsk Accords and their collapse, and in order to avoid collapse of any future agreement between Ukraine and Russia, the author conducted a thorough research into the modern international conflict resolution. Following are the conclusions of this analysis.

Discussion

Numerous researchers and analysts have published their theories and approaches on the topic of conflict resolution, and practitioners have applied them to end the Russian-Ukrainian war.

We will analyze why these efforts have not lead to the desired outcome and how negotiators could succeed in future negotiations, accounting for new technologies, innovative economic models and external relations.

Currently a major paradigm shift is underway in the economy, military and other sectors. In political and military spheres, traditional alliances (notably NATO and the EU) no longer seem as strong as before, while newer ones (such as BRICS) lack many typical features of interstate alliances (they do not have firm political, military or economic commitments). In the economic field, many previously signed agreements are being revisited. In the realm of high technology, a revolutionary transformation is underway, considering the capabilities of AI, big data, drones, nanotechnologies, and other breakthrough R&D areas.

In this context, inter-governmental and inter-company relations, as well as public-private partnerships, are also radically changing: instead of clear long-term agreements, situational alliances are emerging, where former enemies can temporarily become allies/partners or vice versa. However, these partnerships often concern only some narrow issues where the interests of the parties (temporarily) coincide. In international relations, the issue of benefit (usually economic) is increasingly coming to the forefront.

In the absence of professionals within a country capable of modeling optimal actions for the state in this new reality, and/or the will to implement them, such a country becomes a weak link in the modern world and may find itself in a state of instability (or even chaos), as well as become a target for aggression. A crisis may occur due to poor management when control is lost over too many critical sectors. However, in the

longer term, systemic crises may arise from insufficient attention to fundamental sectors such as education, healthcare and infrastructure. Severe problems in these areas can provoke serious discontent among the population.

Challenges faced in preventing renewed conflict and establishing sustainable peace include political, economic, and technological factors. Wars can be viewed as a result of mismanagement by governments, so politicians and decision makers must make sure management is fixed at all levels of the government.

In these circumstances, alternative approaches should be analyzed, including economic, technological and other approaches that are researched below.

The education system of a country also plays an important role. It should foster values such as readiness for cooperation between parties, compassion, the ability to compromise for a greater goal, and the preference for peaceful rather than military solutions to problems.

Negotiations: Identification of Key Success Factors and Pitfalls

Hybrid wars have been insufficiently studied both by military science and international law. Such uncertainty leads to actions taken blindly, which has become one of the reasons for unsuccessful attempts by each party to reach a breakthrough.

Some important practical aspects of the ongoing negotiations are discussed below.

Goals of the conflict parties are important in any peace negotiations. Often, the initial goal is to cease hostilities or, more broadly, cease violence. This is viewed as an alternative to other conflict resolution options, such as a peace agreement or military victory by one of the parties. During a ceasefire, it is possible to establish contacts and communication lines between the parties at various levels, address humanitarian issues etc.

One or both parties may commit to stopping violence. These commitments can be verbal or documented. They may have different geographical scopes and time horizons, and they can also be part of a peace process. Nevertheless, the actual goals of the parties may differ from what they declare. The real goal of a party may be to win or, at the very least, to strengthen its negotiating position, and this goal can change de-

pending on the military situation. Accordingly, the negotiation process and the ceasefire itself can be used as a step towards peace, or as part of military strategy, or as a negotiation "trick." Moreover, the real goals of the parties are not necessarily rational (for example, surprise as part of military strategy might require the party not to pursue a goal that the opponent would logically expect).

Goals of the Conflict Parties

The ideal goals of the conflict parties are incompatible. Russia aims to capture as much Ukrainian territory as possible and to force Ukraine to become a non-aligned country (at least to abandon NATO membership). In the medium term, Russia may be aiming at the annexation of Ukraine and other former Soviet Union republics. Ukraine, on the other hand, seeks to regain its 1991 borders, become a member of the EU and NATO, although Ukrainian representatives have signaled that they willing are at least to consider a ceasefire across the existing front line. However, Russia demands the complete transfer of four Ukrainian regions (in addition to Crimea and Sevastopol). However, after the breakdown of negotiations in 2022, the parties resumed a series of meetings in 2025, which may signal a readiness to abandon their maximal demands.

A ceasefire, as part of military strategy, may be used by a conflict party to consolidate its military success, or to buy time e.g. for entering into military alliances, regrouping and rearming. Moreover, a party may also initiate hostilities in order to propose negotiations at a later stage and secure a result that could not be achieved without armed conflict.

A ceasefire can also serve as a demonstration of strength, a way to consolidate victory or what will be declared as a victory by one or both parties.

If a party seeks peace, a ceasefire (even unilateral) can serve as a clear signal of such intention. A ceasefire aimed at subsequent peacebuilding traditionally involves various de-escalation and confidence-building actions, humanitarian missions and prisoner exchanges. Such a ceasefire often reveals the conflict stakeholders who oppose peace, at least at this stage (peace spoilers). They may deliberately violate the ceasefire to disrupt the peace process. Therefore, in cases where the parties are seriously committed to

a peace process, it is important to implement mechanisms that reduce the risk of violations (such as preventing military incidents and imposing strict sanctions for violations). It is also crucial to emphasize the importance of an effective monitoring procedure to ensure compliance with the ceasefire, as this will make the ceasefire more sustainable.

Finally, if the parties do not see a clear path to a full peaceful settlement or victory for one of the parties, a “frozen conflict” may become the “least evil” option. Accordingly, a ceasefire can establish this state, which could last for years or even decades. Such ceasefires may be periodically extended but they can also be violated. The parties may still decide to extend it despite the violations if they consider the losses acceptable compared to transitioning to full-scale war.

It must be noted, however, that agreements on de-escalation, even if signed by the conflict parties, are also far from being a guarantee of success. However, some signed agreement is highly desired by politicians. As a result, agreements may be signed after a short period of negotiations, only to be broken just as fast. Moreover, even if an agreement is successfully negotiated and signed, politicians tend to “forget” to specify the exact process of its implementation, and the agreement becomes vulnerable to different interpretations by the parties.

Hidden Motives of Conflict Parties: How to Identify and Treat Them

Each conflict party seeks to improve its position in the negotiations. If one party insists on certain political, economic, military or other conditions, their hidden motives and the compromise possibility should be analyzed. Negotiations may follow a standard scenario known to both parties; however, such scenario could be a cover for buying time while the other part of the negotiating team prepares a different scenario and makes arrangements for it.

Often, the beginning of negotiations is hindered by each party’s fear of appearing weak if they are the first to offer negotiations. However, if they sense that the other party is also ready, they can use formulations that appear as responses to offers, e.g. “We have been informed through various channels that you are ready to start negotiations,” or “Based on the battlefield situation,

if you are ready for negotiations, we can consider such an option.” Other forms of contact include exchanges of prisoners of war etc.

Negotiations may also be hindered by other factors, e.g. belligerent statements made by a party “for internal consumption” within their country. These statements quickly become known to the other party and can be interpreted as a lack of readiness to compromise. Wisdom and diplomacy are necessary to prevent misinterpretation of such signals and overreaction to them.

Russian-Ukrainian War: Economic and Social Aspects

The economy of the future requires the modernization of traditionally strong industries (such as IT and aerospace, plus technical education) and the development of new ones (robotics, electronics, AI, nano- and biotechnology), participation in global processes of cooperation and information exchange.

Durable peace depends on Ukraine’s ability to respond to these challenges. Failure to meet them would lead to lack of investment, aggravated by inefficiency in other areas (in particular, related to corruption). This will further reduce people’s incomes, which will lead to social tension and protests, and, accordingly, inability of the state to maintain law and order and ever-reducing cohesiveness of the country. These processes may give a sufficient temptation to an aggressive neighbor to attack Ukraine.

In order to avoid such negative scenarios, Ukraine needs to develop a computer model that will be discussed by the author in his article in the next issue, **“Future socio-economic hypertrends: techno-centric, knowledge-centric and net-centric aspects of Russian-Ukrainian war and negotiations”**. That article suggests a solution how such model can be used in future negotiations and peacebuilding. All of the above practical aspects of negotiations should also be factored into this model.

Conclusion

The international community is trying to persuade the parties of the Russian-Ukrainian war to agree on an armistice or at least long-term cessation of hostilities. However, conventional diplomacy has resulted in limited progress so far.

Alternative conflict resolution approaches explored in the article are based on the bargaining approach. Recommendations to the negotiators are intended to help them conduct effective negotiations, understand the other conflicting party and come to an agreement on a basis of bargaining, so that both parties receive some benefit simultaneously ("win-win" scenario), foregoing zero-sum approaches.

Durable peace in Ukraine depends on its ability to respond to the current socio-economic and defense/military industry challenges.

References:

1. Galtung, J. (1996). *Peace by peaceful means: Peace and conflict, development and civilization*. Oslo: International Peace Research Institute.
2. Zartman, W., & Kremenyuk, V. (Eds). (2005). *Peace versus justice: Negotiating forward- and backward-looking outcomes*. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
3. Pillar, P. P. (1983). *Negotiating peace*. Princeton University Press.
4. Fisas Armengol, V. (2015). *Peace diplomacies: Negotiating in armed conflicts*. Barcelona Escola de Cultura de Pau.
5. Trilateral Contact Group. (n.d.). *Memorandum on fulfilment of the provisions of the Protocol*. Retrieved from https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/en:Memorandum_on_fulfillment_of_the_provisions_of_the_Protocol_on_the_results_of_consultations_of_the_Trilateral_Contact_Group

Вакарін С.

Російсько-українські мирні переговори: врегулювання гібридного конфлікту та його економічні аспекти

Російсько-українська війна – це війна нового типу з використанням економічних та інших гібридних засобів війни. Одночасно у сфері високих технологій відбувається революційна трансформація, в тому числі у військовій сфері, з урахуванням можливостей штучного інтелекту, „великих даних” (бігдата), дронів та інших проривних областей науки. Ця війна не має аналогів у минулому і ще недостатньо досліджена як військовою наукою, так і міжнародним правом. Така невизначеність веде до дій „всліпу”, що стало одною з причин безуспішних спроб (в тому числі за участі міжнародної спільноти) домовитися про мир чи хоча б перемир'я на достатньо довгий строк. Поки учасникам конфлікту, його дослідникам, посередникам не вдалося сформулювати такі причини для припинення війни, які б одночасно для обох сторін здавалися більш переконливими, ніж причини її продовження. Зокрема існує низка ідеологічних, соціальних та інших факторів, які одна з сторін конфлікту може вважати достатніми причинами для продовження війни.

До цього додаються й практичні перешкоди, коли сторона конфлікту має список вимог, яких не може досягнути військовим шляхом, але продовжує наполягати на виконанні їх усіх і не виявляє готовності відступати. Такий підхід є непродуктивним, бо в реальності ситуація може змінитись на користь іншої сторони. Обидві сторони мають бути готові серйозно розглядати можливість компромісу.

Але сучасна політика взагалі не дуже схильна до компромісів. В політичній та військовій сфері традиційні союзи (зокрема НАТО, ЄС) вже не виглядають такими міцними, як раніше, а новіші об'єднання (такі як БРИКС або ШОС) не мають багатьох типових ознак міждержавних союзів (в них немає твердих політичних, військових чи економічних взаємозобов'язань).

В цих умовах зв'язки як між державами, так і між компаніями, а також у державно-приватному партнерстві також змінюються і набувають якісно іншого характеру: тепер на місце чітких довгострокових домовленостей приходять ситуативні союзи.

В економічній сфері також відбувається перегляд багатьох раніше укладених угод.

Для успішності переговорів корисно використовувати економічні категорії, зокрема з практики переговорів про ціну між покупцем та продавцем.

Стан російсько-українських відносин не дає підстав сподіватися на всеосяжну мирну угоду, проте досвід інших воєн дозволяє розглядати такі прагматичні варіанти як угода про завершення війни чи принаймні припинення бойових дій.

Одна сторона може зробити певні поступки, очікуючи, що й друга сторона одночасно піде на поступки. Відповідно, обидві сторони, діючи раціонально, мають стимул прийняти „серединний варіант” з урахуванням цих поступок, враховуючи потенційну шкоду від відмови (у випадку чого угоди не буде й війна продовжиться на невизначений термін).

Перемир'я можна використати для заходів укріплення довіри та/або „цементування” режиму припинення вогню.

У статті надані рекомендації для переговорників. Ці рекомендації спрямовані на те, щоб допомогти переговорникам бути ефективними, зрозуміти іншу сторону конфлікту та дійти згоди на основі торгу, щоб обидві сторони отримали якусь вигоду одночасно („виграш-виграш”), відмовившись від підходів із нульовою сумою, коли насправді програють всі, бо загальна економічна та гуманітарна ситуація погіршується.

Тому завдання переговорів – шукати раціональний компроміс замість небезпечної ставки на те, що противник впаде першим.

При цьому справжні цілі сторін можуть відрізнятися від заявлених. Сторона може прагнути не тільки (і навіть не стільки) миру, а (скільки) перемоги чи принаймні підсилення своєї переговорної позиції, і ця мета може змінюватися залежно від воєнної ситуації. Відповідно, переговорний процес і саме перемир'я може використовуватися як крок на шляху до миру, як частина військової стратегії та/або як переговорний „трюк”.

Проте якщо сторона дійсно бажає миру, то (навіть одностороннє) перемир'я може стати явним сигналом про таке бажання. Перемир'я, яке має стати шляхом до миру, традиційно передбачає й багато заходів з деескалації та укріплення довіри, гуманітарних заходів, обмінів полоненими, які покращують шанси на мирне врегулювання.

Щоб не йти вже пройденими шляхами і не повторювати старих помилок, можна запропонувати підхід, при якому нові покоління з обох сторін залишають минуле в минулому і намагаються знайти модель майбутнього співіснування.

Завершення війни або її гарячої фази відбувається шляхом переговорів, які не завжди можна назвати „мирним процесом”, бо зацікавлені сторони не завжди хочуть миру, не завжди враховують причини конфлікту та інтереси всіх чи хоча б впливових груп. Якщо сторони не бачать однозначного шляху до повноцінного мирного врегулювання або перемоги одної з сторін, „найменшим злом” може стати заморожений конфлікт.

Хто може бути посередником на переговорах? Це залежить від миротворчого досвіду потенційного посередника та його сприйняття обома сторонами як нейтрального учасника.

Сторони можуть припинити чи призупинити конфлікт, якщо дійдуть висновку, що спільний бізнес, торгові зв'язки, участь у глобалізації приносять більше вигоди, ніж зиск (часто ілюзорний), пов'язаний з війною.

Ключові слова: мирні переговори, врегулювання конфлікту, перемир'я, припинення вогню, російсько-українська війна, гібридна війна, Україна, інновації, відновлення